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RECENT CASES
it took the jury to reach its verdict would clearly indicate that the judge's
instructions forced agreement rather than mature deliberation, and provided
sufficient grounds for vacating the jury's verdict.
STEVEN G. BILTEKOFF
CONFLICT OF LAWS-CoLoRADo GUEST STATUTE PRECLUDED RECOVERY
BY GUEST-PASSENGER FROm HER HOST, WHERE BOTH WERE NEw YoRK RESiDENTS TEMPORARILY RESIDING IN COLORADO

Plaintiff and defendant, domiciled in New York state, were summer students at the University of Colorado and had arrived at separate-times in the
city of Boulder. At the time of leaving New York, plaintiff and defendant had
not arranged to meet in Colorado, nor had they planned that plaintiff would
ride in defendant's automobile at any time. On August 11, 1959 plaintiff entered defendant's automobile with his consent, for the purpose of being driven
to Longmont, Colorado. Both parties had intended that plaintiff be driven only
to that destination, and they had made no plans for any other trips. During
the short ride to Longmont, plaintiff received injuries as a result of a collision
with another car, registered in Kansas, and sought to recover damages from
her host for his negligence. Colorado, unlike New York (whose policy allows
recovery by the guest for the host's negligence), has a guest statute which precludes recovery by a guest in the absence of showing gross negligence on the
part of the host.' The trial court,2 invoking the conflict of laws rule recently
defined in Babcock v. Jackson,3 decided as a matter of law that New York law

was applicable. The Appellate Division4 unanimously reversed the trial court
and held that Colorado law must apply. The Court of Appeals held, affirmed,
three judges dissenting. Since the parties were dwelling in Colorado when the
host-guest relationship was formed, the place of the accident was not "entirely
fortuitous," and hence applying the "contacts" test of Babcock, Colorado
law must apply. Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d
463 (1965).
The choice of law rule, that the place of the injury furnishes the law applicable to a tort, was embodied in the original Restatement, Conflict of Laws,
1. Colo. Rev. Stats. Ann. § 13-9-1 (1963): "No person transported by the owner or
operator of a motor vehicle as his guest, without payment for such transportation, shall have
a cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss in
case of accident, unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of such owner
or operator or caused by his intoxication, or by negligence consisting of a willful and
wanton disregard of the rights of others ...."
2. Dym v. Gordon, 41 Misc. 2d 657, 245 N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
3. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) (Plaintiff and defendant,
both residents of New York, set out from Rochester on a trip that took them to Ontario,
Canada. Plaintiff was a guest in defendant's automobile at his invitation. While in Ontario,
plaintiff was injured when the automobile collided with a stone wall. When plaintiff sued
in New York, defendant invoked the Ontario guest statute and moved to dismiss the
complaint. Held, motion to dismiss complaint denied; New York law applied.) See Note, 13
Buffalo L. Rev. 138 (1964).
4. Dym v. Gordon, 22 A.D.2d 702, 253 N.Y.S.2d 802 (2d Dep't 1964).
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section 384 (1934) and until recently, it has been substantially followed in the
courts.5 This rule of lex loci delicti,6 which antedates the vested rights doctrine,"
has been criticized8 because it ignores the interests which jurisdictions, other
that that where the tort occurred, may have in the resolution of particular issues. Similar criticism was voiced against rigid choice of law rules in the field
of contracts. In Rubin v. Irving Trust Co.,' 0 a case dealing with the validity
of a contract to make a will, the Court of Appeals applied the center-of-gravity
test, stating that New York had the most significant contacts with the transaction involved. This test was further elaborated in Auten v. Auten,1 where the
Court stated, ". . . instead of regarding as conclusive the parties' intention or
the place of making or performance, [we] lay emphasis rather upon the law of
12
the place which has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute."
The rule of Auten sparked a successful revolt in the field of contracts and resulted in wide-spread judicial approval of the Restatement, Second, Conflict of
Laws.' 3 A similar revolt in the field of torts took place in Kilberg v. Northeast
Airlines, Inc.,' 4 where a New York resident purchased a ticket from defendant
airline in New York for a flight which ended in a fatal crash in Massachusetts.
The Court weighed the contacts of New York and Massachusetts and concluded
that the limitation of recovery prescribed by the wrongful death statute of Massachusetts should not be applied. This holding was consistent with the center-ofgravity theory, although the theory was not expressly adopted by the Court.
5. See Reed & Barton Corp. v. Maas, 73 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1934) (A coffee urn was
defectively made in Massachusetts and sold in Wisconsin. The caterer, while using the
defective urn, spilled hot coffee upon the plaintiff in Wisconsin. The Massachusetts federal
court applied Wisconsin law to define the liability of the manufacturer); see Kaufman v.
American Youth Hostels, Inc., 5 N.Y.2d 1016, 158 N.E.2d 128, 185 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1959)
(Plaintiff's daughter died in Oregon as a result of a fall while on a tour conducted by
defendant corporation. In a wrongful death action brought in New York, defendant corporation, organized under New York law, invoked the charitable immunity doctrine recognized by Oregon but not by New York. The New York court upheld the defense based on
Oregon law as the place of the injury.).
6. For an explanation of the rule of lex loci delicti, see Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
260 (3d ed. 1949) ; see also, Strumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 182 (2d ed. 1951).
7. For an explanation of the vested rights doctrine, see Hancock, Torts in the Conffict of Laws 30-36 (1942).
8. See Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 881 (1951); Currie,
Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 Stan,
L. Rev. 205 (1958); Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 69 Yale L.J. 595

(1960).

9. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws, §§ 332, 334, 358 (1934).
10. 305 N.Y. 288, 113 N.E.2d 424 (1953).
11. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
12. Id. at 160, 124 N.E.2d at 101.
13. § 332 (Tent. Draft no. 6, 1960). See Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441
(1961) (In a contest between Illinois and New York laws concerning a support agreement
for an illigitimate child, Illinois law was applied as having the "most significant contacts.");
W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945) (Validity of a cognovit
note upheld by using the "center-of-gravity" test.)
14. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) (Court refused to apply
New Jersey law as the place of the tort with respect to the quantum of recovery, in a death
action arising out of a fatal airplane crash, where decedent had been a New York resident
and his relationship with defendant airline had originated in New York.)
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Considering the array of cases involving workmen's compensation, 15 torts arising

out of contractual relations, 16 family immunities' 7 and defamation,' 8 along with
Kilberg and Auten, the groundwork for Babcock was well laid.' 9 In Babcock,
plaintiff and defendant, both residents of New York, set out from Rochester
on a trip that took them to Ontario, Canada. Plaintiff was a guest in defendant's
automobile and while in Ontario, she was injured when the automobile collided
with a stone wall. When plaintiff sued in New York, defendant invoked the
Ontario guest statute and moved to dismiss the complaint. The Court of Appeals denied defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint and held that New
York law applied.
After the Babcock decision, the courts of New York were not entirely clear
on where Babcock left the New York conflicts rule relating to torts. In Gore
v. Northeast Airlines,20 relatives of a New York resident, who had been killed
in an accident in Massachusetts, sought damages in a federal district court of
New York for his wrongful death. On facts closely analogous to those in Kilberg, the court applied the Massachusetts limitation of recovery on the ground
that the center-of-gravity was not located in New York, since the residences of
the beneficiaries were not in New York. 2 In some cases, the lower New York
courts seemed to give little weight to Babcock.22 In later cases, however, Babcock began to exert a stronger influence on the courts' reasoning which was
evidenced by a more refined articulation and application of the center-of-gravity
approach (although the results obtained under these decisions would have been
similar under the lex loci delicti). In Fornaro v. Jill Bros., Inc., 23 the law of
15. See, e.g., Alaska Packers Ass'n. v. I.A.C. of California, 294 U.S. 532 (1935) (State
where contract of employment entered into may apply its own law to out-of-state injury).
16. See, e.g., Dyke v. Erie Ry., 45 N.Y. 113 (1871) (contract for carriage by rail
between two points in New York but through Pennsylvania; the injury occurred in Pennsylvania by whose law recovery was limited to $3,000; on theory of New York contract,
$35,000 allowed).
17. See, e.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) (Question of
domestic relations and capacity to sue governed by the law of the state of the family
domicile, not the place of the tort.)
I& See, e.g., Dale System, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 527 (D.Conn. 1953) (multistate libel suit-law of the plaintiff's domicile applied).
19. Compare Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 Duke L.J. 1,
with Currie, Comment on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1233 (1963). For an
excellent critical evaluation of Babcock see Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 Colum. L.
Rev. 1212 (1963), with notes by Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar and Reese.
20. 222 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
21. Query: Should the residence of the beneficiaries be a determinant factor, when
under modern living conditions, they are likely to be widely scattered?
22. See Slavenburg Corp. v. Howard Sober, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Montalvo v. Morales, 18 A.D.2d 20, 239 N.Y.S.2d 72 (2d Dep't 1963); Ernst v. State, 38
Misc. 2d 264, 237 N.Y.S.2d 458 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
23. 22 A.D.2d 695, 253 N.Y.S.2d 771 (2d Dep't 1964) (At time of accident, deceased
with his sister and parents, residents of New York, were in New Jersey on a visit to the
Jill's, who were relatives of the deceased. On the morning after arrival, deceased's aunt
took him on an auto trip to the store, on which trip an accident occurred, resulting in the
deceased infant's death. Decedent's parents sued corporate owner of auto on theory of
vicarious liability. Held, New Jersey law applied to issue of vicarious liability.)
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New Jersey was applied, with respect to the issue of vicarious liability, to an
accident occurring in New Jersey which resulted in a New York resident's
death. In Manning v. Hyland,24 plaintiff, a resident of New York, was injured
in New Jersey while a passenger in an automobile owned and operated by defendant, a resident of New Jersey. After the accident, plaintiff and defendant
were married in New Jersey and at the time of the suit were residents of that
state. The New York court granted the husband immunity under New Jersey
law, discounting the plaintiff's contention that Babcock called for the application of New York law. In Murphy v. Barron,25 plaintiff, a passenger in an automobile owned and operated by his wife, was injured in a collision with a trailer
truck which was under the control of the defendant. Plaintiff was a resident
of New York, defendant was a resident of New Jersey and the accident occurred in Pennsylvania. Defendant filed a third party complaint against plaintiff's wife, and plaintiff moved to dismiss the third party complaint on the
ground that a joint judgment is a prerequisite to the right of contribution under
the law of New York. The New York court denied plaintiff's motion and applied Pennsylvania law stating, ". . . the substantive right to contribution,
recognized in states such as Pennsylvania, where a joint judgment is not a
prerequisite, may be procedurally enforced in this state though the problem of
contribution is treated differently here." 2 6 The court held that New York
did not have a predominant interest or concern with the rights of the parties.
The approach taken by the court in Murphy is similar to that taken by the
Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws.21 In Blun v. American Youth Hostels,
Inc., 28 defendant, a New York corporation, conducted a tour which was to begin and end in New York. Plaintiffs, residents of New York, were members of
the tour which took them to the state of Oregon. While in Oregon, an accident
occurred, injuring the plaintiffs. In a suit to recover damages, defendant sought
to invoke the charitable immunity doctrine then recognized by the state of
Oregon, but not recognized by the state of New York. The New York court
applied New York law as to the issue of immunity on the ground that New
York had a dominant interest in the rights of the parties. The court emphasized
the factors of domicile and basis of the relationship, and de-emphasized the
factor of the relative time spent in the place of the accident. A peculiar problem
arises in applying the Babcock doctrine to cases involving wrongful death statutes. In Long v. Pan American World Airways,29 a Pennsylvania resident pur24. 19 A.D.2d 652, 241 N.Y.S.2d 908 (2d Dep't 1963).
25. 45 Misc. 2d 905, 258 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
26. Id. at 907, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
27. § 379(a)(1) (Tent. draft no. 8, 1960). See also § 279 comment (d), which states,
"When the actor's conduct and the personal injury occur in the same state, the local Ia,v of
this state determines almost invariably, the rights and liabilities of the parties." Compare the
approach taken in Briggs, The Jurisdictional-Choice-of-LawRelation in Conflicts Rides, 61
Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1948).
28. 21 A.D.2d 683, 250 N.Y.S.2d 522 (2d Dep't 1964).
29. 23 A.D.2d 386, 260 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1st Dep't 1965).
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chased an airplane ticket from defendant airlines in Pennsylvania, for a round
trip to Puerto Rico and return. During the return trip, the plane disintegrated
in air and fell into the state of Maryland. Defendant airline's main office is in
New York, where a wrongful death action was brought. Under the Maryland
statute, a cause of action lies only in favor of a spouse, child or parent of the
decedent, or a person wholly dependant upon him. The court dismissed the
action on the ground that the decedent left no such relative or person. The
qualifying clause of the Maryland statute could not be avoided by alluding to
the rationale of Kilberg. The court stated that, since the basis of a wrongful
death action derives solely from statutes which have no extra-territorial effect, 0
either there is a cause of action under the lex loci delicti, or there is no cause
of action anywhere. 31 As stated in Babcock and clearly demonstrated in a recent decision handed down by the Appellate Division,3 2 the various issues involved in the litigation will be isolated, and the law of one of the competing
jurisdictions will be applied to a particular issue in accordance with the dominance of interests and contacts referable -to that issue. In Ardieta v. Young, 3
plaintiff was a passenger in the defendant's automobile when an accident occurred in Ontario, Canada involving an Ontario motorist. Both plaintiff and
defendant were residents of New York. Settlement was effected with the Ontario motorist and the plaintiff executed a release which, under Ontario law
would not release the defendant, but under New York law would release him.
JThe court held that Ontario law applied to the release but New York law applied to the host-guest relationship. In Brewi v. Handrick,3 4 an action between
two New York residents for injuries sustained in Florida on a trip which began
and was to end in New York, New York law rather than the Florida statute,
was applied to the issue of the host's liability to his guest passenger. The
Florida statute denies recovery to the guest in the absence of a showing of
gross negligence on the part of the host. The facts of that case are closely
analogous to those of Babcock, with two important differences: (1) The Ontario statute in Babcock completely bars the claims of a guest-passenger, while
Florida permits a guest to recover from his host on a showing of "gross negligence."135 (2) The Brewi case involved a two car collision, while in Babcock
30. Whitford v. Panama R.R. Co., 23 N.Y. 465 (1861).
31. The result reached seems to be rather unjust considering the fact that the
Babcock rationale was developed specifically to avoid subjecting travelers to varying state
laws. Here, however, the court was dealing with a qualifying clause of a death statute, rather

than a limitation of recovery clause (as in Kilberg), which it could not treat as remedial.

Perhaps the non-extraterritorial effect of death statutes should be re-examined in the
light of the purposes underlying the Kilberg-Babcock rationale.
32. Ardieta v. Young, 22 A.D.2d 349, 256 N.Y.S.2d 199 (4th Dep't 1965).
33. Ibid.
34. 45 Misc. 2d 121, 256 N.Y.S.2d 1-71 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
35. This distinction was held to be of no consequence in the Babcock case (12 N.Y.2d
at 484, n.14). Yet it is evident that the New York courts will not be as hesitant to apply
.a, less Draconian law, such as the Florida statute, as they will be to apply a statute that
directly contravenes New York's sense of justice.

447
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only the host's car was involved.3 6 In Macey v. Rozbicki, 7 plaintiff was injured
in a collision which occurred while plaintiff was visiting defendant at defendant's summer home in Ontario, Canada. The accident occurred while defendant was driving to church with plaintiff, and involved a Canadian car which
was not involved in the suit since settlement was made with plaintiff. The New
York court applied the Ontario guest statute on the ground that the facts were
more akin to Dym than to Babcock. With regard to the time factor (the relative time spent by the parties in the place of the accident), the facts of Brewi
may have involved a longer time spent in the locus delicti than the facts of
Macey. However, since the host-guest relationship in Brewi was based in New
York, New York law was applied. Had the accident in Brewi occurred sometime
after the parties -had arrived in Florida, and had they intended to spend the
entire winter season vacationing or "dwelling1 3 8 there, the court might have
39
applied Florida law.
To justify the application of New York law, the plaintiff in the instant
case referred to (1) insurance written and delivered in New York, (2) registration of the automobile in New York, (3) the domicile of both parties in New
York and (4) the policy of New York to compensate guest-passengers for the
negligence of their hosts. The Court, in rejecting these four elements as suggesting a quantitative rather than a qualitative test, stated that by the use of those
references plaintiff attempted to distort Babcock into a rule of domicile or one
directed toward public policy. The Court, searching instead for a qualitative test,
set forth three purposes underlying Colorado's guest statute: (1) the protection
of Colorado drivers and their insurance carriers against fraudulent claims, (2)
the prevention of suits by ungrateful guests and (3) the priority of the claims of
injured parties in other cars to the assets of the negligent defendant. In considering which state had the superior claim for the application of its law (policy), the
Court presented three factual distinctions between the instant case and Babcock.
Initially, unlike the instant case, Babcock did not involve a collision between two
cars. Secondly, in Babcock the host-guest relationship was "seated" in New
York, while in the instant case, ". . . the relationship itself and the basis of its
36. Since persons or property in the state of Florida may be affected by the outcome
of the suit, there is what has been referred to as a "real conflict" (as opposed to the "false
conflict" situation involved in the Babcock case). See Currie, Comments on Babcock v.
Jackson, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1233; see generally Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of
Laws (1963).
37. 23 AMD.2d 532, 256 N.Y.S.2d 202 (4th Dep't 1965).
38. In the first portion of his opinion in the Dym case, Burke, J. referred to the
parties as "temporarily residing" in Colorado. However, later in his opinion, he made use
of the rather ambiguous term, "dwelling." Apparently, to Burke, J., the latter carried the
same meaning as the former.
39. This hypothetical fact situation has not, up to this point, come before the courts
of New York, at least not in the context within which we are dealing. However, some
indication is given in the majority opinion of Dym to support this conclusion. The Court
stated, "Of compelling importance in this case is the fact that here the parties had come to
rest in the state of Colorado and had thus chosen to live their daily lives under the protective arm of Colorado law . . . . In Babcock, the New Yorkers at all times were in
transitu and we were impressed with the fundamental unfairness of subjecting them to a law
which they in no sense had adopted." Instant case at 125, 209 N.E.2d at 795, 262 N.Y.S.2d
at 467.
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formation ....-4o was "seated" in Colorado. Since the relationship was seated
in Colorado, and the accident arose out of Colorado based activity, the Court
reasoned that the fact the accident occurred there could in no sense be termed
fortuitous. Thirdly, of compelling importance to the Court was the fact that the
parties had come to rest in Colorado, choosing to live their daily lives under the
protective arm of Colorado law. The Court stated that the physical situs where
the relationship was created and the time of its creation, along with the general
intent of the parties, was controlling. The alleged contacts of New York referred to by the plaintiff were reduced by the Court to the one contact of
domicile, and the natural incidents thereof. To give domicile such a preferred
status would be to substitute a conflicts rule as inflexible as its lex loci predecessor. In answer to the plaintiff's reference to the policy of New York as a
contact in favor of that state, and also to Chief Justice Desmond's narrow approach in his dissent, the Court stated, "Judicial hostility to 'guest' statutes and
a preoccupation with New York social welfare problems . . . should not be
treated as 'contacts' which are found then to outweigh the factual contacts."'
The Court further stated that public policy, per se, should ". . . play no part in
a choice of law problem." 42 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Fuld took the position that there is no material distinction between the factual situation in Dym
and that in the Babcock case. He stated that the majority's emphasis on the
involvement of another vehicle in the accident was "Misplaced," since the other
automobile was driven by a resident of Kansas and was apparently licensed
in that state. He further stated: "Nothing turns on the circumstance that in
this case the guest-host relationship was formed in the foreign jurisdiction.1 43
Considering these two propositions in the light of the contacts of Colorado
as set forth by the majority, there remains one contact in favor of that state,
i.e., the fact the accident occurred there. This contact, standing alone, was not
sufficient to give Ontario a "legally cognizable interest" in having its policy
applied in the Babcock case, and should not be sufficient in the instant case.
On the other hand, the contacts in favor of New York are the same in the
instant case as they were in Babcock. The public welfare argument advanced in
the Babcock opinion was again alluded to by Judge Fuld stating, ". . . the consequences resulting from an uncompensated injury generally affect the community in which the injured party resides . . . . 44 Without doubt, the most
cogent point advanced by Judge Fuld in response to the contacts in favor of
Colorado alleged by the majority, was his assertion that a jurisdiction may be
said to be "concerned" with a specific issue only when its governmental interests
and policies enter into the making of a particular decision. Chief Judge Desmond,
concurring with Judge Fuld in a separate opinion, argued that, " . . . no state
40.

Instant case at 125, 209 N.E.2d at

41. Id. at 126, 209 N.E.2d at
42. Id. at 128, 209 N.E.2d at
43. Id. at 131, 209 N.E.2d at
44. Id. at 132, 209 N.E.2d at

794,

262 N.Y.S.2d at 467.

795, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
796, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
798, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 472.

799, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 473.
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can have any discoverable 'interest' in the application of its own special public
policies as to . . . tort litigations in another State between two persons, both
resident of that other State. '45 The concepts of "contacts," "center of gravity"
and "interests" provide no satisfactory guidelines for lower courts to decide cases
and lawyers to advise their clients. Furthermore, judges will disagree as to
where these interests lie. The Chief Judge's approach was apparently devoid
of any evaluative process, as he stated simply that New York's policy is not
to be departed from purely because the accident; affecting only New York
residents, happened beyond its borders. He justified this position by declaring
that the ". . fear of being accused of making or using 'mechanical' rules
should [not] deter us from developing such new decisional formulae as the
46
need for them appears in our society."
Judge Fuld, in his dissenting opinion, made no mention of "fortuity," but
concerned himself only with comparing the "interests" of New York and
Colorado. Had the place of the accident been entirely fortuitous, the majority
might have agreed that New York's interest outweighed that of Colorado, notwithstanding the fact that a Kansas car was involved. Chief Justice Desmond
held that New York's policy in cases like these was settled by Kilberg and
Babcock, yet he too discounted the fact that the instant case is not at all like
Kilberg and Babcock insofar as here, the place of the accident was not entirely
fortuitous. The majority in the instant case clearly stated that public policy
should play no part in making the choice of law, yet the Court took pains to
delineate the purposes underlying the Colorado guest statute. It is submitted
that the majority might have avoided any discussion of the policies of the
respective states by first dealing with the question of fortuity. Answering this
question would have enabled the Court to dispose of the case without having
to examine the "contacts" or "policies" of the respective states. Looking back at
the array of cases preceding Dym, one finds that the element which sparked the
revolt against the rule of lex loci delicti was "fortuity." How much consideration
has been given to this element in the more recent decisions? The three factors
underlying the fortuity concept which have been considered by the courts are:
(1) the time factor, (2) the basis or seat of the relationship and (3) the intent
factor (emphasized by the majority in the instant case). The chance of an
accident occurring in a given jurisdiction increases as the length of time spent
by the parties in that jurisdiction increases. Similarly, if the relationship between
the parties was based in the locus delicti, then it can hardly be said that an
accident occurring there was entirely fortuitous. For a host-guest relationship
to be considered as "based in the locus delicti," the relationship must have
originated there, and the parties must intend that it end there. Finally, if the
parties had intended to spend a considerable length of time in a given jurisdiction, and an accident did in fact occur there but after only a short time, it
45.

Id. at 135, 209 N.E.2d at 801, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 475.

46. Id. at 134, 209 N.E.2d at 801, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
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seems rather tenuous to argue that the place of the accident was entirely fortuitous. For the mere circumstance that the accident occurred after only a short
time in that jurisdiction does not effect the fortuity factor, which is conceptually
established prior to the accident. If the Chief Judge's plea for more satisfactory
guidelines is to be answered, the courts must carefully distinguish between these
factors underlying the fortuity concept and the concepts of "contacts" and
"interests." In analyzing the fact situation involved in a litigation, if the court
finds that the place of the accident was any less than "entirely fortuitous,"4
taking into consideration the factors underlying the fortuity concept (not "contacts"), it should apply the lex loci delicti. If on the other hand, the locus delicti
is found to have been entirely fortuitous, the court then will proceed with
weighing the "interests" of the respective jurisdictions. "Contacts" seems to be
a meaningless term, for only contacts that create "interests" should be considered
in making the choice of law. The place of the accident is a "contact," but
one of no consequence if it does not create an "interest" from a fact other than
the mere occurrence of the accident there. The circumstance that parties or
property of the place of the accident have been affected by the accident or may
be affected by the outcome of the suit, are facts incidental to a "contact" (place
of injury) and create an "interest" in that jurisdiction. Domicile, on the other
hand, is a "contact" which ipso facto creates an "interest" in that state,
i.e., to settle disputes between its own citizens. Similarly, to confuse the meaning
and application of the term "policies" with the term "interests" will lessen the
chances of ever achieving a logically integrated rationale. After it has been
determined that the place of the accident was entirely fortuitous, the "policy"
of the locus delicti will be considered only if the "contacts" are sufficient to
create an "interest" in that jurisdiction. On the other hand, it is apparent that
when two New York residents are involved in an accident in another state, the
"contact" of domicile itself creates an "interest" in New York, and will automatically place New York's "policy" in contention. The suggested rationale,
although developed under the factual situation presented by the instant case,
is not intended to be so limited. It is evident, however, that succinct guidelines
48
cannot be established without first clarifying the concepts involved.
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47. Id. at 125, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
48. The latest case in this area apparently has misconstrued the Court of Appeals' directive as set forth in Dym and mistakenly interpreted it as requiring a return to the discredited
rule of lex loci delicti. Kell v. Henderson, 47 Misc. 2d 992, 994, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647, 649 (Sup.
Ct. 1955). "The Court, in that case [Dym], held that the law of the place of the accident
must govern."

